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The question, “What is intelligence?” is deceptively simple. However, scholars 
have engaged in series of research in order to answer it. Till date there is no 
simple answer accepted by experts in the relevant disciplines. Attempt to identify 
a standard definition has been very challenging. This failure is connected with 
the fact that defining intelligence requires the application of problematic and 
abstract concepts. Consequently, some researchers decided to put forward 
theories as an attempt to capture the nature of intelligence. However, this option, 
as reflected in this paper, further deepens the problem it purports to resolve. The 
paper is an inquest into the intellectual travails of scholars who fruitlessly 
attempted to grasp the nature of intelligence. The paper avers that these travails 
are caused by scholar’s reliance on ontological proof of intelligence which 
stipulates the possession of brain and mind as evidence of intelligence. The 
epistemological proof which relies on overt behaviour as index of interpreting 
intelligence is projected by the paper as a plausible means of overcoming the 
nebulous nature of the concept. 
 




An ontological proof of intelligence focuses on the phenomenon 
responsible for what is perceived as intelligence. Such phenomena are generally 
conceived as brain and mind. Consequently, advocates of this channel of 
understanding intelligence simply offer definitions or theories of the term that 
are anchored on brain or mind possession. This paper reveals that this approach 
inherits the philosophical hangover of the complexity and perplexities 
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associated with the discourse on brain and mind themselves. The 
epistemological proof which is an alternative approach conceives intelligence in 
term of overt behaviour. Philosophical behaviourism is introduced as a 
theoretical framework for this approach. Consequently, behaviourist inclined 
scholars aver that definitions, notions or theories of intelligence should be 
anchored on overt behaviour. 
After weighing the two approaches, albeit philosophically, this paper 
concludes that the scientific element in the epistemological approach provides 
the avenue for a robust and simpler way of understanding intelligence. In 
justifying this conclusion, the paper is systematically divided into three sections. 
In the first section, various definitions of intelligence, as culled from wide range 
of literatures on the subject shall be critically examined. The objective is to reveal 
how it has been impossible to arrive at a universally acceptable definition of the 
concept. Theories of intelligence as offered by scholars in related disciplines 
shall be put forward for critical scrutiny in the second section. In the final 
section, the weaknesses of these theories and the problem of non-availability of 
universal definition of intelligence shall be traced to the complexity and 
perplexities of understanding the human brain and mind. The section shall 
further engage in the behaviourist interpretation of intelligence. 
 
DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE 
The systematic search for comprehensive and scientific understanding of 
intelligence and its development has been a major pursuit of psychologists for 
over a century (Weinberg, 1989:98).  Perhaps, due to the complex and elusive 
nature of the concept, the effort is yet to yield a universally accepted definition. 
A convenient technique used by researchers in this domain is the articulation of 
working definitions that can suit their purposes.  However, P.A. Vroon (1980:1) 
points out that daily usage of the word rarely provides a clear definition of the 
term.  In 1904, C.E. Spearman advances the definition that intelligence is the 
tendency of all human abilities to be positively correlated (quoted in Saggina et 
al, 2006:3).  This definition amounts to claiming that if an individual is found to 
be good at one thing there is tendency for him to be good at other things. L. 
Gottfredson, in collaboration with fifty-two experts in the field, defines 
intelligence as “a very general mental capability that, among other things, 
involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, 
comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience” 
(Gottfredson, 1997:13). The notion that intelligence is a single unitary ability has 
been a source of heated debate among practitioners in the field. A. Anatasi, 
avers that “Intelligence is not a single, unitary ability, but rather a composite of 





several functions” (Anatasi, 1992:610).  For him, intelligence denotes that 
combination of abilities required for survival and advancement within a 
particular culture. 
A. Binet and T. Simon propose that intelligence is a fundamental faculty that 
is crucial to practical life.  In their words, “This faculty is judgement, otherwise 
called good sense, practical sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting one’s self to 
circumstance” (quoted in Legg and Hutter, 2007:5). J. Person conceives 
intelligence as “a biological mechanism by which the effect of a complexity of 
stimuli are brought together and given a somewhat unified effect in behaviour” 
(quoted in Legg and Hutter, 2007:5). 
D. Wechsler and D. Simonton also lay emphasis on the relation between 
intelligence and the ability to adjust to environment. Weschler defines 
intelligence as the “aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act 
purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with the environment 
(Wechsler, 1975:135). In Simonton’s view, intelligence is “certain set of cognitive 
capacities that enable individuals to adapt and thrive in any given environment 
they find themselves in” (Simonton, 2003:n.p).  Unlike Wechsler and Simonton, 
P. Kine gives primacy to learning.  For him, “intelligence is popularly defined as 
the ability to learn, understand and deal with novel situations” (Kline, 1991:1).  
As for A. Antonov, “thinking” should be the right criterion for intelligence.  
Consequently, he avers that “Human intelligence is a scope of all types of 
human thinking.  That is, we shall include into intellectual human activity not 
only rational thinking, but also emotional thinking, unconscious thinking, 
intuitive thinking, and automatic control of biological system” (Antonov, 
2011:164). 
Interestingly, D.W. Pyle argues that “The short answer to the question 
‘What is intelligence?’ is that we are just not sure!” (Pyle, 1979:1). He argues that 
the word “intelligence” is a “situation-specific” word.  That is, the word is used 
in various situations (rightly or wrongly) and, thus, takes on various meanings 
depending upon the particular situation (Pyle, 1). 
To a large extent, the orientation or perspective adopted by a researcher or 
writer determines the notion of intelligence he or she adopts. Thus, the biologist 
would stress the ability to adapt to the demands of the environment; the 
educationalist the ability to learn; some psychologists emphasise the 
measurement of the ability to reason and other cognitive functions; others the 
development of these functions; and probably the layman would mumble 
something about commonsense’ (Pyle, 3). 
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Oftentimes, researchers (for instance Spearman) tend to use the term 
“intelligence” as a noun, thereby creating the erroneous impression that it is a 
concrete entity.  This approach usually makes us think that the word is referring 
to something tangible and concrete (a quantity of something in the brain, 
perhaps) (Pyle, 5).  However, a more appropriate way of using the word, as far 
as Pyle is concerned, is to consider it as an adjective meant to qualify human 
behaviour.  For him, “intelligence is rather a matter of ways of behaving and 
acting, and not something that a person has” (Pyle, 5). 
Now, since intelligence is culture bound, variance in definitions is 
inevitable; any definition of intelligence must take into account the culture in 
which an individual is reared. Intelligence is inextricably interwoven with the 
beliefs, values, language, concepts and orientations of a particular group or race 
of people (Pyle, 6). This means that a particular definition of intelligence may be 
suitable for one cultural group and unsuitable for another.  Sometimes too, the 
way in which a particular definition is applicable to one cultural group may be 
different from another. The American Heritage Dictionary (4th edition) for 
instance advances that intelligence is “The capacity to acquire and apply 
knowledge”. Given that what constitute knowledge, to an Australian Aborigine, 
may not be so to the average American living in New York, a grade “A” 
American college student might not be deemed intelligent by the Aborigine, and 
vice versa. This popular example shows that linking intelligence with 
knowledge acquisition and usage does not conclusively determine the meaning 
of intelligence. 
Despite the difficulty surrounding the attempt to arrive at a universally 
acceptable definition of intelligence, researchers remain undaunted in their 
desire to unravel its nature and essential characteristics. To this end, some 
scholars endeavour to offer theories to capture the essence of intelligence. 
 
THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE 
Generally, theories of intelligence can be assigned to one of two camps, 
“lumpers” or “splitters”. Lumpers, (for instance Spearman) define intelligence 
as a general unified capacity for acquiring knowledge, reasoning, and solving 
problems that is demonstrated in different ways (Weinberg, 98).  The splitter, 
such as L. Thurstone, R.J. Sternberg, J.P. Guilford and H. Gardner hold that 
intelligence is composed of many separate mental abilities that operate more or 
less independently (Weinberg, 99). 
 
 
CHARLES SPEARMAN’S “G” FACTOR THEORY 





At the beginning of 20th century, a British psychologist, Charles Spearman, 
put forward the theory that intelligence is one general mental capability 
underlying human performances on all intellectual tasks.  His conclusion was 
based on the observation that individuals who scored highly in one test of 
mental ability tend to score high in other tests while those who scored low in a 
specific test equally performed poorly in other tests.  This suggests that all tests 
of mental ability were positively correlated. 
Spearman reasoned that if all mental tests were positively correlated, there 
must be a common variable or factor producing the positive correlations.  
Consequently, employing a psychometric method of factor analysis, Spearman 
proposed that two factors could account for individual differences in scores 
arising or derived from mental tests.  He called the first factor “general 
intelligence” or the “general factor” represented as “g”.  According to 
Spearman, “g” underlies all intellectual tasks and mental abilities.  The “g” 
factor represents what all the mental tests had in common (Detterman, 
2008:n.p). Spearman considers “g” as “mental energy” and states that it was the 
“leading part of intelligence, as is displayed by the ability to handle not merely 
abstract ideas, but above all symbols” (Spearman, 1927:211). 
The second factor Spearman identified was the “Specific factor” or “s”. The 
specific factor relates to whatever unique abilities a particular test required; as a 
result it differs from test to test (Detterman, n.p).  However, the attention of 
Spearman was more focused on general intelligence. 
Since its proposal in 1904, the general factor of intelligence (“g”) has 
generated considerable controversy (Kane & Brand, 2003:7).  Indeed, the belief 
in general intelligence, going by R. Weinberg, has historically been the primary 
justification for using a single index of intelligence, the IQ (intelligence 
quotient), for a variety of assessment purposes (Weinberg, 99).  H. Kane and C. 
Brand observe that, “central to any empirically based model of intelligence is the 
crucial position and function of Spearman’s “g” factor.  Spearman’s “g” 
routinely accounts for more variance than all other cognitive factors combined, 
and therefore assumes a position of hierarchical prominence in any model 
depicting the structure of human cognitive abilities” (Kane & Brand, 21).  Its 
popularity notwithstanding, critics of Spearman’s “g” factor maintain that it 
does not provide the true picture of the nature of intelligence.  Intelligence is 
manifested in different ways (Thurstone, 1938; Gardner, 1993). Moreover, a 
number of studies have failed to show the consistency of performances across 
tests. 
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LOUIS THURSTONE’S MULTIPLE FACTORS THEORY 
In 1938, an American psychologist Louis Thurstone carried out an 
experiment which appears to disprove Spearman’s “g” factor. The experiment 
highlighted seven independent factors as the foundation of intelligence rather 
than the much held general factor. 
Thurstone calls his newly discovered factors “primary mental abilities”.  To 
identify these abilities, he and his wife, Thelma, devised a set of 56 tests.  They 
administered the battery of tests to 240 college students and analysed the 
resulting test scores with new methods of factor analysis that Thurstone had 
devised.  Thurstone identified seven primary mental abilities: (1) verbal 
comprehension, the ability to understand word meanings; (2) verbal fluency, or 
speed with verbal material, as in making rhymes; (3) numeracy or arithmetical 
ability; (4) memory, the ability to remember words, letters, numbers, and 
images; (5) perceptual speed, the ability to quickly distinguish visual details and 
perceive similarities and differences between objects; (6) inductive reasoning, or 
deriving general ideas and rules from specific information; and (7) Spatial 
visualization, the ability to mentally visualize and manipulate objects in three 
dimensions (Thurstone, quoted in Detterman, n.p). At least one of these primary 
mental abilities leads to variation in the results of intellectual tasks. 
Although, Thurstone’s hypothesis on multiple factors was initially 
vindicated by his intelligence test conducted on college students, anomalies 
reared up when the test was extended to an intellectually heterogeneous group 
and individuals in the general population.  The new test produced a result that 
re-affirms Spearman’s “g” factor theory.  It was therefore observed that the 
restriction Thurstone placed on the range of subject selected for the test led to 
his failure to arrive at general intelligence in the first place. D. Detterman 
reiterates the problem with Thurstone’s theory with the observation that even in 
college students, the tests that Thurstone used were still correlated.  He argued 
that the method of factor analysis that Thurstone devised made the correlations 
harder to identify.  As a matter of fact, when other researcher reanalyzed his 
data using different methods of factor analysis, more correlations became 
apparent.  The researchers concluded that Thurstone’s battery of tests identified 
the same “g” factor that Spearman had identified (Detterman, n.p). 
Despite the shortcomings of Thurstone’s Multiple Factor approach to 
intelligence, the theory turns out to be a catalyst to the development of theories 
on multiple intelligences.  The likes of J.P. Guilford, R.J. Sternberg and H. 
Gardner were inheritors and developers of Thurstone’s idea on intelligence.  
 
JOY GUILFORD’S STRUCTURE OF INTELLECT THEORY 





Like his American counterpart, Thurstone, Joy Paul Guilford rejected 
Spearman’s view that intelligence could be characterized by the single “g” 
factor.  For him, Human intelligence is divergent in nature. In 1967, Guilford 
explicated his idea of intelligence in what he calls ‘structure of intellect' theory. 
Guilford describes the structure of intelligence as manifested in different 
abilities. These abilities are in three dimensions, namely, content, product, and 
operation.  He develops tests for each possible combination of these dimensions, 
based on the belief that an individual could perhaps score high on some of these 
abilities and less on others. 
Under “content”, Guilford identified five different forms of information that 
an individual may process comfortably. These are (i) “visual” information 
which depends on the sense of sight, (ii) “auditory” information obtained 
through the sense of hearing, (iii) “symbolic” information derived from the 
power to interpret symbols, (iv) “semantic” information based on the power to 
interpret words or sentences, and (v) “behavioural” information obtained 
through the power to interpret the mental states and behaviour of observed 
individuals. Guilford believes that an individual may be good at processing 
symbolic information (for instance a poet) but may be poor at visual information 
where an artist usually excels. 
An individual’s intelligence can also be informed by the kind of “product” 
he is processing.  Products include units, classes, relations, systems, 
transformations and implications. Thus, an individual may express creativity in 
perceiving visual units such as shapes or even behavioural units such as facial 
expressions, and so on. While the two dimensions discussed above, can be used 
to sort out the different kinds of information we can think about, the 
“operation” dimension simply describes what the brain does with these 
information.  The brain could use them to perform the following functions: 
cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, and 
evaluation.  Thus, an individual may exhibit intelligence in the cognition of 
semantic units, cognition of behavioural transformation, and so on. Another 
individual may be good at retrieving information from memory. 
H. Kane and C. Brand (2003) suggest that Guilford’s theory of intelligence 
completely removes the possibility of Spearman’s general factor of intelligence. 
The theory eventually gained wide acceptance, especially with educators and 
social environmentalists who consider the possibility of a biologically based 
general factor unpalatable (Kane and Brand, 2003:10).  However, the theory has 
been criticized on the ground that it is unnecessarily complex and, hence, 
violates the rules of parsimony. There is also the problem of replicating 
Ifiok: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies                                              Vol. 4, July, 2018 
 
148 
Guilford’s result upon re-analysis, thereby raising the question of the reliability 
of his instruments (Kane and Brand, 2003). R. Sternberg, another American 
psychologist, advanced a less cumbersome theory. 
 
ROBERT STERNBERG’S “TRIARCHIC MIND” THEORY 
Robert Sternberg propounded a three-sided theory of intelligence. 
According to him, intelligence is built on three cornerstones (Weinberg, 1989).  
The first is that intelligence cannot be understood outside of a socio-cultural 
context.  What is “intelligence” in one environment may be irrelevant in 
another.  Thus, the ability to adapt to ones environment is an important aspect 
of intelligence.  The second is that intelligence is purposeful, goal-oriented 
relevant behaviour consisting of two general skills: the ability to deal with novel 
tasks and the ability to develop expertise, that is, the ability to learn from 
experience to perform mental tasks effortlessly or automatically. Thirdly, 
intelligence depends on acquiring information-processing skills and strategies. 
It is against this backdrop that Sternberg posits three categories according to 
which intelligence can be classified.  These are: analytical, creative and practical 
abilities.  He contends that intelligence behaviour arises from a balance between 
them.  Furthermore, these abilities function collectively to allow individuals to 
achieve success within particular socio-cultural contexts.  Analytical abilities 
enable the individuals to evaluate, analyze, compare and contrast information.  
Creative abilities generate invention, discovery, and other creative endeavours.  
Practical abilities tie everything together by allowing individuals to apply what 
they have learned in the appropriate setting.  To be successful in life the 
individual must make the best use of his or her analytical, creative and practical 
strengths, while at the same time compensating for weaknesses in any of these 
areas.  This might involve working on improving weak areas to become better 
adapted to the needs of a particular environment, or choosing to work in an 
environment that values the individual’s particular strengths. A person with 
highly developed analytical and practical abilities may find it difficult to work 
in a field that demands above-average ability in creative thinking. However, if 
the person chooses a career that requires creative abilities, the individual can use 
his or her analytical strength to come up with strategies for improving this 
weakness.  Thus, a central feature of the Sternberg’s theory of successful 
intelligence is adaptability both within the individual and within the 
individual’s socio-cultural context (Sternberg, reviewed in Plucker, 2003). 
We can commend Sternberg’s effort on the ground that he is able to broaden 
the domain of intelligence to correspond more with what people frequently 
think intelligence is.  However, critics believe that scientific studies do not 





support Sternberg’s classification of intelligence.  For example, some scholars 
propose that practical intelligence is not a distinct aspect of intelligence, but a set 
of abilities predicated by general intelligence (Detterman, 2008:n.p). 
 
HOWARD GARDNER’S THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 
One of the most popular theories on the multiplicity of intelligence was put 
forward by the American cognitive psychologist, Howard Gardner.  In his 
magnum opus Frames of Mind (1993), Gardner posits “Theory of Multiple 
Intelligences”, which incorporates linguistic intelligence, musical intelligence, 
logical-mathematical intelligence, spatial intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, 
interpersonal intelligence and naturalist intelligence.  Gardner writes that 
“There are at least eight discrete intelligences, and these intelligences constitute 
the ways in which individuals take in information, retain and manipulate that 
information, and demonstrate their understandings (and misunderstandings) to 
themselves and others” (Gardner & Veenema, 1996:70). Thus, Gardner’s theory 
does not reckon with the notion of the “g” factor as the underlying element  
behind information processing. 
In formulating his theory, Gardner places less emphasis on explaining the 
results of mental tests than on accounting for the range of human abilities that 
exist across cultures.  He drew on diverse sources of evidence to determine the 
number of intelligences in his theory.  For example, he examined studies of 
brain-damaged people who had lost one ability such as spatial thinking, but 
retained another, such as language.  The fact that two abilities could operate 
independently of one another suggested the existence of separate intelligences.  
Gardner also proposes that evidence for multiple intelligences comes from 
prodigies and savants.  Prodigies are individuals who show an exceptional 
talent in a specific area at a young age, but who are normal in other aspects.  
Savants are people who score low on IQ tests – and who may have only limited 
language or social skills- but demonstrate some remarkable ability, such as 
extra-ordinary memory or drawing ability.  To Gardner, the presence of certain 
high-level abilities in the absence of other abilities also suggested the existence 
of multiple intelligences (Determan, 2008:n.p).  Consequently, he avers that 
human beings are better thought of as possessing multiplicity of intelligences 
rather than a single general intelligence put forward by Spearman. 
Gardner further makes it clear that his theory makes two strong 
fundamental claims: 
The first claim is that all human beings possess all of 
these intelligences: indeed, they can be considered a 
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definition of ‘homo-sapiens’, cognitively speaking.  
The second claim is that, just as we look different and 
have different personalities and temperaments, we 
also exhibit different profiles of intelligences.  No two 
individuals, not even identical twins or clones, have 
exactly the same amalgam of intelligences, 
foregrounding the same strengths and weaknesses.  
This is because, even in the case of identical genetic 
heritage, individuals undergo different experiences 
and also seek to distinguish their profiles from one 
another (Gardner, 1998/2004:4). 
The mark of being human is the possession of these eight intelligences even 
though they are exhibited in profiles that vary from individual to individual. 
Logical-Mathematical Intelligence permits individuals to use and appreciate 
relations; Musical Intelligence makes it possible for individuals to create, 
communicate, and understand meanings generated from sound; Spatial 
Intelligence permits individuals to perceive and transform spatial information 
and recreate visual images from memory; Bodily-Kinaesthetic Intelligence 
permits individuals to use all or parts of the body to create products or solve 
problems; Intrapersonal Intelligence helps individuals to distinguish among 
their own feelings, to build accurate mental models of themselves, and to draw 
on these models to make decisions; Interpersonal Intelligence enables 
individuals to recognize and make distinctions about others feelings and 
interventions; and Naturalist Intelligence which allows people to distinguish 
among, classify, and use features of the environment (Gardner, 1993; Veenema 
et al, 1997). 
Although Gardner’s theory was enthusiastically accepted by educators 
because it suggests a wider goal than adopted in traditional education 
(Detterman, 2008), it has been severely criticised. It has been argued that 
Gardner interpreted intelligence in his theory to depict human ability; the eight 
forms of intelligence are mere expressions of individuals’ ability. Gardner’s 
theory lacks empirical support since its fundamental postulations are not backed 
by rigorous experimental findings. Besides, Gardner is yet to advance any test 
with which to measure each of the intelligences (Detterman, 2008). This brings 
us to the perplexing philosophical debate over the use of intelligence test as an 
approach to proving and as well measuring intelligence. 
 
ONTOLOGICAL VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROOF OF 
INTELLIGENCE 





Throughout our discourse on definitions and theories of intelligence, a 
fundamental perspective about the nature of the subject matter continues to 
recur.  This is the notion that intelligence is a mental capacity employed by 
humans to deal effectively with the environment, solve problems, adapt to 
situations and learn (Antonov, 2011; Gottfredson, 1997; Guilford, 1967; Kline, 
1991; Simonton, 2003; Spearman, 1927).  As a mental act, intelligence is 
traditionally seen as an object belonging to or originating from the human brain 
(Pyle, 1979:5); or a product of the human mind (Searle, 1980:434).  On this 
ground, the proof of intelligence, it is argued, lies in the possession of brain and 
mind (Searle, 1980). 
While agreeing that intelligence is indeed a mental act, some scholars who 
proffered different theories on human intelligence also advanced cognitive tests 
of behavioural disposition as proof of intelligence (Guilford, 1967; Spearman, 
1927; Thurstone, 1938). Consequently, there are two possible proofs of human 
intelligence: the ontological proof, which stipulates the possession of brain and 




THE ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLIGENCE: THE MIND-
BRAIN FACTOR 
A typical ontological argument of intelligence possession runs thus: 
 
P1 Intelligence is a mental act 
P2 Mind and brain is the seat of mental act 
Therefore, mind and brain possession is the hallmark of intelligence. 
 
The thrust of the argument above is that an agent must of necessity possess 
brain and mind before it could be deemed intelligent.  The various definitions 
and theories of intelligence so far reviewed reveal that intelligence essentially 
plays the critical role of aiding humans to relate effectively with the 
environment, solve problems, adapt to varying situations, learn, etc.  A closer 
examination of these roles shows that they actually presuppose certain mental 
phenomena such as believing, deliberating, feeling, knowing, deciding, 
choosing, etc.  A presumed intelligent agent that wants to “solve a problem”, for 
instance, is expected to (i) have an understanding of the problem in question,  
(ii) possess the ability to reflect about various possible solutions to the problem, 
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(iii) possess the will to choose an appropriate solution and then execute.  
Eventually, when the problem is solved, the agent is described as intelligent.  
The processes outlined above are characterized by mental activities. 
John Searle, an American philosopher, identifies certain features of mental 
phenomena that he considered critical to intelligence.  These are consciousness, 
intentionality and subjectivity.  Describing what consciousness is can be very 
challenging. Searle  himself complained that “I believe it is, by the way, 
something of a scandal that contemporary discussions in philosophy and 
psychology have so little of interest to tell us about consciousness” (Searle, 1984, 
quoted in Stumpf, 1993:482).  David Chalmers sounds even more perplexed 
about this phenomenon.  In his words: “Consciousness can be startlingly 
intense.  It is the most vivid of phenomena; nothing is more real to us. But it can 
be frustratingly diaphanous” (Chalmers, 1996: 3). However, for the present 
purpose, we take consciousness to be a mental act of awareness, thinking 
process or sensation.  In this regard, an entity is expected to have sense of 
awareness, capable of thinking or have sensation in order to exhibit intelligence. 
Intentionality is easier to explain than consciousness. It is, according to 
Searle, the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer 
to, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than themselves. 
Intentionality does not merely refer to intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, 
hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, irritation, amusement, and 
all those mental states (whether conscious or unconscious) that refer to, or are 
about the world (Searle, 1984, quoted in Stumpf 1993:482). According to Searle, 
being intelligent is to be in a mental state that is directed at states of affairs in the 
world. 
The subjectivity of mental states, sometimes referred to as “qualia”, denotes 
the unique experience of each individual when in a mental state.  According to 
Searle, this subjectivity is marked by such facts as that I can feel my pains, and 
you can’t.  I see the world from my point of view; you see it from your point of 
view.  I am aware of myself and my internal mental states, as quite distinct from 
the selves and mental states of other people (Searle, 1984).  It is presumed that 
an intelligent agent should have its own subjective experience and on its basis 
makes decisions. 
All mental phenomena including intelligence are believed to be anchored on 
consciousness, intentionality and subjectivity. In philosophical discourse 
concerning the origin of thought, these three features are considered as 
properties of mind and brain.  Similarly, intelligence is rooted in the possession 
of mind and brain, since they are characterized by features that make 
intelligence possible.  Consequently, the possession of mind and brain is 





fundamental to the possession of intelligence.  This view, however, raises some 
critical questions.  Consider the following: 
i. If mental acts that necessitate intelligence originate from the “mind” 
then what is the nature of the “mind”? 
ii. If mental acts that indicate intelligence originate from the “brain”, 
then how can the brain, a material substance, account for mental acts? 
Depending on an individual’s metaphysical orientation as either an idealist 
or materialist, all mental acts may be viewed as activities of the mind or as an 
epiphenomenon of the brain.  However, arriving at correct answers to the 
questions above constitutes a source of serious debate in philosophy and other 
related areas. For epiphenomenalists, it is very challenging to explain how the 
human brain, a material substance, causes mental acts.  It is equally difficult 
determining or pinning down the nature and workings of the human mind due 
to its subjective nature.  William Morris argues that most of us would defend to 
the last ditch the existence and worth of our minds, but we easily become 
embarrassed if we are asked to say very much about the nature of that mind 
which we hotly defend (Morris, 1929: 153).  He warns that “in raising the 
problem of the nature of mind, we are plunged into a problem of the greatest 
difficulty and of the deepest importance” (Morris, 153).   
Theories formulated to explain the mind can be grouped into three classes, 
which are (i) mind as substance, (ii) mind as organic or personal unity and (iii) 
mind as an association of experience (Titus, 1959: 155). 
 
i. Substance Theory of Mind 
According to this theory, the mind is one of the underlying realities or 
qualities which man is made of. The mind is a non-material aspect of man, the 
other being the body. Plato and Rene Descartes are two foremost advocates of 
this theory. Plato considers the human mind or soul as an indivisible substance 
that pre-existed in a super-sensible world of ideas but which unites with the 
human body to form the human person in the sensible world. At death, the soul 
shall survive the body due to its immaterial nature. The soul at this point has 
achieved purification. In Phaedo , Plato explains that purification is the 
“separation of the soul from the body... the habit of the soul gathering and 
collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her 
own place alone, as in another life” (quoted in Stumpf, 904). The soul itself is the 
abode of reason, emotion and sensual feeling.  Each of these corresponds with 
the rational, spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul as characterized by 
Plato. 
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Influenced by Plato’s thought, Descartes also offered a substance theory of 
mind. Beginning with the “methodic doubt” he decided to cast everything aside 
and begin anew in the quest for an indubitable starting point or foundation of 
knowledge. The first indubitable reality he discovered was the self. Descartes 
reports his discovery in his famous saying “cogito ergo sum”, (“I think; 
therefore I am”). From the “cogito”, it follows that human personality or 
individuality is a basic fact. Descartes subsequently affirms the existence of God, 
who is the ultimate generator of our knowledge and of an external world of 
matter. Cartesian metaphysics posits two substances, mind and matter. The 
mind is immaterial; it is conscious, and its main characteristic is thinking.  Since 
it is a substance, it cannot be destroyed except by God, who is the only self-
existent substance.  The fundamental characteristic of matter is extension.  





ii. Mind as Organic or Personal Unity 
This theory takes the mind as the immaterial element in man that organizes 
human experience.  Immanuel Kant who rejected the substance theory of mind 
is associated with the organic theory.  He argues that the organization of 
experiences in various ways is made possible by a principle or agent called the 
mind.  He explains this in terms of “synthetic, unity of apperception” or 
“transcendental unity of apperception”.  There is an organic or personal unity 
which transcends or surpasses the separate experiences.  This unity we call the 
self.  The self, or the soul, is sometimes spoken of as the seat of the forms of 
knowing. 
For Kant, the mind is active; it organises systematically all the materials 
presented by the various senses to yield knowledge of the phenomena. 
According to him, time and space and other categories are forms of the mind 
which transforms the manifold presentations of the senses into intelligible and 
knowable reality. Mind is not a separate mental substance; it is the organization 
and unity of man’s personal experiences (Titus, 156). 
 
iii. Mind as an Association of Experience 
David Hume, an eighteenth century British empiricist advanced the theory 
of mind as an association of experience.  The mind and the faculties of the 
mental life are nothing but an association of ideas.  Mind is a term for the sum 
total of experiences, or a collection of sensations (Titus, 157).  A reflection on 





what lies within us does not point to any substance but rather to fleeting 
experiences or collection of sensations. 
While the theories examined above may differ in their conception of 
“mind”, they all characterised it as an immaterial element associated with 
humans. Having presented intelligence as a mental act, it could be seen as 
appropriate to trace its origin to the immaterial mind. However, materialists (or 
physicalists) insist that it is the by-product of brain activity. Such philosophers 
argue that all mental phenomena or activities of the mind actually originate 
from the brain.  Intelligence is thus a product of the brain and not the mind, in 
the final analysis. 
Epiphenomenalism is an exemplar of the materialist theory of mind. 
According to this view, consciousness, mind, all mental acts whatever, are 
secondary phenomena accompanying some bodily processes.  Mental processes 
causally influence neither the physical processes nor even other mental 
phenomena.  Matter is primary, the one real substance.  The stream of 
consciousness is a phenomenon accompanying certain neurological changes. 
Thus the mind is an effect, an important effect for that matter, which appears 
under some conditions.  Certain processes taking place in the brain and nervous 
system produce the sensations, feelings, emotion, imagery, thought, or other 
types of consciousness that we experience (Titus: 163).  In his “Minds, Brains 
and Science”, John Searle emphatically states that “… all mental phenomena 
whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, 
thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the 
brain” (quoted in Stumpf, 483). Indeed, Searle’s claim and that of other 
materialists on this issue tend to rely on advancement in brain research.  For 
example, scientists have studied people who have suffered damage to various 
portions of the brain and have found that different kinds of brain damage 
produce regular and specific breakdown in a person’s cognitive and 
psychological functioning. Also, detailed studies of normal brains with our 
sophisticated medical instruments shows that when a person is performing 
certain task (imagining a scene, speaking, calculating a sum), characteristic 
changes take place in the brain (Lawhead, 2003: 218). 
Consequently, from the physicalist or materialist point of view, to know that 
an entity is intelligent, all that is needed is detailed study of the brain of the 
entity. The human brain, unlike the mind, is amenable to objective investigation.  
Some objections, however, weakens this seemingly attractive position of 
physicalism. 
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The biologist, J.B. Haldane, criticises the materialist interpretation of mind 
thus:  
It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere 
by-product of matter.  For if my mental processes are 
determined wholly by the motion of atoms in my 
brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are 
true… and hence I have no reason for supposing my 
brain to be composed of atoms (Quoted in Lawhead,  
229). 
If Haldane’s argument is sound, then it would be impossible to hold any form of 
belief whatsoever if we take the materialist’s position to its logical conclusion. A 
popular criticism against the materialist is the argument that brain states are not 
identical with mental states.  Paul Churchland argues that: 
 
Brain states and processes must of course have some 
specific spatial location: in the brain as a whole, or in 
some part of it.  And if mental states are identical with 
brain states, then they must have the very same spatial 
location.  But it is literally meaningless… to say that 
my feeling-of-pain is located in my ventral thalamus, 
or that my belief - that - the sun - is - a - star is located 
in the temporal lobe of my left cerebral hemisphere.  
Such claims are as meaningless as the claim that the 
number 5 is green, or that love weighs twenty grams 
(Churchland, 1984:29). 
Chen Gang (2005) supports Churchland’s argument by making a distinction 
between physical state or event and mental state or event.  A physical event is 
what we observe from an external point of view.  It is public to all of us.  A 
mental event is what we actually perceive from an internal point of view.  Thus, 
if we subject an individual who is in pain to a test of brain observation, we can 
never have direct access to his feeling about this pain or the pain itself.  Gang 
argues that we cannot have direct reliable means into the individual’s pain.  The 
best we can get is an indirect unreliable means, i.e., by observing the patterns of 
neural firings and blood circulation in certain district of the brain, and the 
mapping between mental events and neural events accumulated in the past.  
The mapping is not reliable since there is some kind of plasticity in the human 
brain.  Brain surgery has proved that, after the removal of one hemisphere, some 
of its functions can be recovered in the other hemisphere.  This is so-called 
“multiple-realization” phenomenon.  Therefore, there is no general psycho-





physical law to support this kind of mapping (Gang, 2005:3).  The argument is 
further strengthened with the explanation that even when brain process is 
observed, it is still not mental event that is being observed but rather another 
form of physical event.  A contemporary philosopher of mind, David Chalmers, 
comments about the futility in studying consciousness through brain process 
thus: “We have good reason to believe that consciousness arises from physical 
systems such as brains, but we have little idea how it arises, or why it exists at 
all.  How could a physical system such as a brain also be an experiencer?” (1996: 
xi). 
It is apparent that neither the idealist nor the materialist has solved the 
problem of the nature and origin of mental acts.  Consequently, it still remains 
debateable to claim either that intelligence as a mental phenomenon originates 
from the mind or that it originates from the brain.  We are yet to have the final 
answer on the nature of the mind (the supposedly ontological origin of 
intelligence); or offer plausible explanation of how intelligence, a mental 
phenomenon, or any mental phenomenon for that matter can be ascribed to 
brain process. 
Two notable twentieth-century philosophers, the American, John Dewey 
and the British, Gilbert Ryle offer the reason why the search for the proof of 
intelligence and other mental phenomena should shift from ontological 
direction to epistemological direction. Their stance revolves around the notion 
that the evidence of mental phenomena is cognitive and lies in overt 
behavioural dispositions. By implication, the evidence for intelligence 
technically lies in the test of appropriate behavioural disposition. 
 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTELLIGENCE: THE 
BEHAVIOURAL FACTOR 
Rather than viewing the mind as a mental or physical entity, John Dewey 
employed it as an instrument for describing human behaviour.  In his The Quest 
for Certainty (1929), Dewey avers that “there is no separate ‘mind’ gifted in and 
of itself with a faculty of thought; such a conception of thought ends in 
postulating a mystery of a power outside of nature and yet able to intervene 
within it” (277).  What we call the mind is simply a description of how man 
reacts to his ever changing environment.  In fact, mind and thought are 
functional aspects of the interaction of natural events.  Mind is simply intelligent 
behaviour (Titus: 158). 
Gilbert Ryle argues that the mind is the manner or the way in which a 
person behaves; hence there is no ‘ghost in the machine’ propelling human 
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action.  As Titus explains, Ryle is simply anxious to get rid of what he calls the 
traditional “dogma of the ghost in the machine”, and to rectify the “category 
mistake” or “philosopher’s myth”.  This mistake and myth are found when men 
put the facts of mental life in a category or class to which these facts do not 
properly belong.  Ryle uses an example of a foreign visitor on a university 
campus.  The visitor, after being shown the college halls, library, dormitories, 
playing fields, administration offices, and the activities associated with them, 
asks to see the university.  The university, he is told, is just the buildings and 
activities he has seen.  To talk about the university as some counterpart to what 
he has seen is a mistake.  In the same way, to talk about “mind” or 
“consciousness” as some counterpart to human behaviour or as some world 
behind or beyond the activities is a mistake.  The meaningful referent of the 
concept “mind” is explained by describing how persons behave (158-159). 
As already indicated in our discussion of theories of intelligence, some 
philosophers and psychologists believe that in matters of intelligence, the issue 
of mind or consciousness should not arise; instead, emphasis should be placed 
on intelligence tests.  To the question “How do we know that a person is 
intelligent?” William Lawhead responds with a rhetorical question: “Don’t we 
know by the way the person behaves and responds to situations and, in 
particular, by how well he or she does in intelligence tests? (Lawhead, 230). 
William Lycan’s response is that “Surely we tell, and decisively, on the basis of 
our standard behavioural tests for mental states … we know that human being 
has such-and-such mental states when it behaves, to speak very generally, in the 
ways we take to be appropriate to organisms that are in those states.” (Lycan, 
1987: 125). 
Lycan draws our attention to the fact that the proof of the mental states lies 
in epistemological investigation rather than metaphysical one.  Edgar Brighman 
(1951) throws more light on this point with the argument that if we do not study 
mental states with the appropriate method we may not actually arrive at the 
truth about consciousness.  A metaphysical or ontological study of mental acts 
can best be achieved through the act of introspection, that is, the act of turning 
attention to one’s own consciousness.  Brighman quickly points out the 
methodological problem of this approach and the wisdom in employing the 
method of observation.  According to him: 
 
The method of introspection suffers from the defect of 
giving information about the consciousness of one 
person only, namely, the introspector himself.  It 
would seem that data derived from such a restricted 





field are too fragile a basis on which to rear a 
psychology and philosophy of consciousness.  Hence, 
psychology has always had recourse to the method of 
the objective observation of behaviour.  We observe 
that our own consciousness is followed or preceded by 
certain kinds of behaviour, and we believe that similar 
behaviour on the part of others is accompanied by 
similar consciousness.  If, then, we are to know 
anything about the consciousness of others, we must 
observe their behaviour - watch their reactions to 
stimuli, listen to their words, note their gestures and 
facial expressions (Brighman, 1995:186). 
 
The method of using behaviour as index of mental state is popularly 
referred to as behaviourism.  P. Churchland who sometimes refers to it as 
“philosophical behaviourism” summarises it as the claim that talk about 
emotions and sensations and beliefs and desires is not talk about ghostly inner 
episodes, but is rather a shorthand way of talking about actual and potential 
patterns of ‘behaviour’(Churchland, 1984:23). Similarly, intelligence as a subset 
of mental state is a pattern of behaviour. But what is behaviour and what is 
intelligent behaviour? 
 
By behaviour, we mean those activities of an organism that can be observed 
by another person or by an experimenter’s instruments (Hilgard, 1962: 6). These 
activities are of diverse forms. They could be in form of the organism’s speech 
acts or body movements like moaning, laughing, crying, facial reactions, 
muscular vibration, and etcetera. They could also be in form of sudden 
perceived changes in skin tone (like turning pale), body temperature, blood 
pressure, and sweat secretion. The importance of behavioural dispositions is 
that they are plausible means of inferring the unobservable mental events. In the 
words of G. Graham: “Pain is moaning. Happiness is smiling. If we could 
subtract behaviour from mind we would have nothing left over” (Graham, 1993: 
39-40). Indeed, the importance of the role of behaviour in the study of mental 
states cannot be overemphasised in the field of psychology. As early as 1913 
when modern psychology was barely few years old, an American psychologist 
named John Watson attacked the definition of psychology as “the study of the 
mind”. The content of another person’s mind, he noted, cannot be directly 
observed. Science, Watson asserted, studies public, out-in-the-open objects and 
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events that anyone can observe and record. A true science cannot be based on 
what might be a figment of an introspector’s imagination. Therefore, said 
Watson, to be truly scientific we should focus on behaviour, which we can 
observe instead of thoughts and thought process, which we can only guess at 
(Watson, in Geiwitz, 1980:6).  
From the foregoing, intelligent behaviour is viewed as the behavioural 
instantiation of whatever we define or theorise as intelligence. For instance, 
intelligent behaviour, for Thurstone, shall be equated with the exhibition of 
those activities associated with his identified seven primary mental abilities. 
While Sternberg will see it as the instantiation of analytical, creative and 
practical abilities, Gardner will equate it with the observation of activities 
exemplifying his “eight multiple abilities”. This means that there is a causal 
relation between intelligence and behaviour. The latter is presumed to be 
informed by the former. Psychologists anchor this position on what they call 
Stimulus-response theory (S-R theory). This is the assertion that all behaviour is 
in response to stimuli (Hilgard, 17). It is in an attempt to confirm or disconfirm 
this causal relation that psychologists introduced intelligence tests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Behaviourism encourages intelligence tests as means of measuring human 
intelligence.  Such tests are usually administered by a qualified psychologist, 
according to professional and ethical principles. Interpretation is based on a 
comparison of the individual’s responses with those previously obtained to 
establish appropriate standards for the test scores (Schnitzer, 2008: para. 1). At 
this point we can argue that between the ontological and epistemological 
approaches for proving intelligence, the latter approach is more plausible and 
less controversial.  Its strength lies in its simplicity.  We need not dissect an 
individual’s brain or try vainly to search for his mind to determine if he were 
intelligent.  His behavioural disposition, sometimes prompted by appropriate 
cleverly devised tests, is a plausible means. The role of consciousness, mind or 
brain is not necessarily undermined here. The argument is that the various 
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